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Abstract
Matt Sellers is currently pursuing a J.D. at The University of Oklahoma College of Law. Mr.
Sellers has extensive experience in computer programming and web development, including the
creation of an ordering system and online streaming video program for Oklahoma lawyers
pursuing Continuing Legal Education courses. He also worked as a web developer for Jupiter
Media Metrix, where he used the Internet to promote IT events. Below, this author outlines
recent litigation concerning Verizon Internet Services and Recording Industry Association of
America, including an exploratory discussion on the issues of the constitutionality and the
purview of subpoena power under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Shifting the Burden to Internet Service Providers: The Validity of Subpoena Power Under
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Matt Sellers
I.

Introduction

The illegal distribution of copyrighted material over the Internet is a widespread practice
in America today, due in large part to peer-to-peer software. 1 This type of software provides
Internet users with a means to search other users’ computers for material to download. The
search capability of this software is completely passive and innocuous from a theoretical
perspective, while in practice allowing for the widespread illegal transfer of copyrighted
materials such as digital music and motion picture files. The question posed to copyright holders
seeking to put an end to this practice is whether copyright litigation should be targeted at the
peer-to-peer companies or the individual copyright infringers.
In April 2003, the motion picture and music recording industries lost in a critical case to
the peer-to-peer software corporation named Grokster. 2 However, in the same month a different
district court upheld the constitutionality of the subpoena power under the Digital Millennium
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The most popular brands of peer-to-peer software include KaZaA, Grokster, eDonkey, and Morpheus.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that
distributors of peer-to-peer software are not vicariously liable for the copyright violations of users).
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Copyright Act (DMCA) 3 which grants a copyright holder the authority to issue a subpoena to an
Internet Service Provider (ISP) in order to obtain the identity of subscribers suspected of
infringing upon its copyrights. 4 The district court ruled on the constitutionality of the DMCA’s
subpoena provision notwithstanding the argument that such subpoena power violates Article III
of the U.S. Constitution’s case and controversy requirement and allegedly abridges the First and
Fifth Amendment rights of Internet users. 5 In an earlier case heard by this same district court,
Verizon Internet Services rigorously argued that the subpoena power did not apply to its
corporation simply because Verizon provides a passive forum for users to download and share
copyrighted music. 6 The prevailing party in both cases, Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA), represents the five largest record companies in the world. RIAA claimed that
subscribers on Verizon’s network were offering music files to others using peer-to-peer software
in violation of RIAA’s copyrighted interest in these songs. 7 Collectively, the two Verizon
decisions have persuaded ISPs across the nation to disclose the identity of specified users who
RIAA claims are infringing on its copyrighted songs.
On September 8, 2003, RIAA filed copyright infringement lawsuits against 261
individual Internet subscribers. 8 After RIAA’s sweeping win in Verizon, many more lawsuits
against alleged copyright infringers are expected. 9 Despite RIAA’s win on the constitutionality
of the subpoena power granted to copyright owners under the DMCA, other litigation is pending
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17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2000).
In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 275 (D.D.C. 2003).
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Id.
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In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 29 (D.D.C. 2003).
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Paul R. La Monica, Music Industry Sues Swappers, CNN, Sept. 8, 2003, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2003/09/08/technology/riaa_suits/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
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Cynthia L. Webb, Settling in With the RIAA, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2003, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21601-2003Sep30.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
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with similar constitutional challenges. The most serious challenge to the Act is the broad power
proscribed to court clerks, power which appears to transcend the authority of the judiciary under
Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Other constitutional concerns involve potential First and
Fifth Amendment violations.
II.

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998

The DMCA amended the Copyright Act 10 to limit the liability of ISPs for copyright
violations by its users. Four levels of liability are covered by the Act; the level of liability an ISP
may be subject to depends on the type of service the ISP provides. 11 The ISPs least liable are
those that merely act as a passive conduit for communications created, controlled, and stored by
others. 12 Verizon and Pacific Bell, two companies currently involved in litigation with RIAA,
fall within this category.
In order to subpoena an ISP for the identities of alleged copyright infringers, a copyright
holder must file a proposed subpoena, a sworn declaration of purpose, and a notification with the
clerk of a district court. 13 The notification of claimed infringement must be signed, include a
description of the copyrighted work and the infringing material, as well as an accompanying
statement that the requesting party has a good faith belief that use of the material is not
authorized, under penalty of perjury. 14 The notification requirements are described within the
same section of the Act which outlines the liability for service providers who actually store
information. Since passive ISPs are covered in a different section altogether, 15 Verizon and

10

17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000).
17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2000).
12
17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000).
13
17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2000).
14
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2000).
15
17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000).
11

3

1 OKLA. J. L. & TECH. 8 (2003)
(formerly 2003 OKJOLT Rev. 8)
www.okjolt.org
Pacific Bell claim that the subpoena power was not intended to apply to them. 16 Furthermore,
since peer-to-peer software did not exist in 1998, the year in which the Act took effect, these
ISPs argued that Congress did not contemplate the idea of imposing such liability on passive
ISPs when it enacted the DMCA. However, RIAA countered this argument in the first Verizon
decision by pointing out that the clear language of the statute provides that the subpoena power
grants the authority to issue subpoenas to “service providers,” defined as being applicable to any
provider of online services or network access, and not specific to any particular category of
service providers defined under the Act.17 Passive ISPs were strong advocates of the DMCA at
its inception, so it follows that they had ample opportunity to voice these concerns at that time. 18
Sarah B. Deutsch, Verizon’s associate general counsel, later stated, “In hindsight, it was a
mistake to agree to [the subpoena provision of the DMCA]. We thought it would be rarely
used.” 19
Another point of contention centering on the statutory language of the subpoena
provision concerns its similarity with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 45. One clause in
the DMCA states that “the procedure for issuance and delivery of the subpoena…shall be
governed to the greatest extent practicable” by the handling of a subpoena duces tecum under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). 20 However, under FRCP 45 the proponent of a
subpoena duces tecum must reasonably compensate the recipient for some expenses incurred in
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Complaint For Declaratory Relief, available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/PacBell_v_RIAA.pdf (last visited Nov.
29, 2003).
17
Verizon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 32. See also 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2000).
18
Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of the Recording Industry Association of America and Urging Affirmance,
available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/pdf/amicusBriefSupportRIAA.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
19
Frank Ahrens, Use of Subpoena to Name File Sharers Criticized, WASH. POST, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A19721-2003Sep29 (last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
20
17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(6) (2000).
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complying with the subpoena provisions. 21 RIAA has completely failed to provide reasonable
compensation to any ISP that produces user identities. As for now, it is far from clear how
strictly the analogy to FRCP 45 will be constructed since this issue was not addressed by the
district court in either of the Verizon decisions.
III.

Judicial Power Under Article III

The second key issue in the debate between the RIAA and ISPs rests on the
constitutionality of the subpoena power of the DMCA under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
The exercise of judicial power is limited to “cases or controversies,” 22 yet subpoena power under
the DMCA calls upon the clerk of the court to issue subpoenas to ISPs without any pending case
requirement. 23

This subpoena is issued in the name of the district court and carries the

enforcement authority of the court. A violation of the order could also provide a basis for
contempt proceedings; a basis that implies the order is of a judicial nature.
In the second Verizon decision, the district court nevertheless upheld the constitutionality
of the DMCA under Article III, reasoning that by issuing a subpoena under the DMCA, the clerk
is performing a “quintessentially ministerial duty” which involves no discretion and thereby does
not constitute an exercise of judicial power.

24

This ministerial duty was, in fact, specifically

intended by the legislature when it enacted the DMCA.

25

The U.S. Supreme Court has

repeatedly upheld the use of ministerial duties as being independent of the judiciary, 26 but it is

21
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FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(iii)
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

(2003).

23

17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1) (2000).
Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 250. In so holding, the Verizon court relied largely on Chief Justice Marshall’s
comments in Custiss v. Georgetown & Alexandria Turnpike Co., 6 Cranch 233 (1810). In Custiss, Marshall stated
that “the legislature may direct the clerk of a court to perform a specified service, without making his act the act of
the court.” Id.
25
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 51 (1998).
26
Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
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not certain whether this justification can be used for the issuance of a subpoena. 27 Congress has
enacted several statutes that purport to provide this power to court clerks with respect to FRCP
45, but few court cases have dealt with this issue. 28
Another significant challenge to the Article III holding is the notion that the subpoena
power could place a substantial burden on the judiciary’s ability to perform by inundating the
court system with subpoena requests. Although the district court in the second Verizon decision
dismissed this claim with the rationale that it “is entirely speculative, as no such barrage of
requests has occurred,” 29 the Federal District courthouse in Washington, D.C., has hired extra
clerks to deal with litigation from the music industry in the months that have followed. 30 As
RIAA gears up for another round of lawsuits, this burden on the court system may become an
even stronger argument in favor of ISPs.
IV.

First Amendment and Procedural Due Process

ISPs have also argued that the subpoena power under the DMCA is overbroad, allowing a
copyright owner to obtain the identities of Internet users who are not violating any of its
copyrights. Because of the lack of judicial scrutiny, ISPs argue that the subpoena power could
be used by anyone that claims to have a copyright, including “cyberstalkers,” in order to obtain
the identity of users from Internet protocol (IP) addresses, which are generally not difficult to
determine. As one representative of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) pointed out,
"[T]here is nothing to stop a vindictive business or individual from claiming copyright to acquire
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Id. at 251.
Id.
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Id. at 256.
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Chris Taylor, Downloader Dragnet, TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 04, 2003, available at
http://affiliate.timeincmags.com/time/archive/preview/from_search/0,10987,1101030804-471178,00.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2003).
28
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the identity of critics." 31 Normally, a subpoena of this nature requires some underlying crime
and must be approved and signed by a judge. Under the DMCA, the notification requirement is
the only evidence that needs to be submitted to the court, and such requirements are not subject
to any immediate judicial scrutiny.
In the second Verizon decision, the court held that the ISP did not have any evidence that
DMCA subpoenas had been used by RIAA to identify anyone other than Internet users engaging
in copyright infringement. 32 But since the case has been decided, charges have been dropped
against several Internet users incorrectly identified as copyright infringers, including a highprofile case in which RIAA wrongly obtained the identity of an elderly schoolteacher who did
not even possess the correct computer with which to run peer-to-peer software. 33
ISPs and civil liberties groups argue that the relative ease with which a DMCA subpoena
can be obtained violates Internet users’ fundamental right to anonymity 34 and, as a result, will
have a “chilling effect” on free speech and expression of Internet users. Both ISPs and civil
liberties groups claim that Internet users are denied procedural due process 35 when copyright
holders are able to remove users’ anonymity without providing notice or opportunity to be heard,
effectively shifting the burden to the ISP to protect its users’ Fifth Amendment rights. 36
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Declan McCullagh, RIAA Draws Civil Liberties Opposition, CNET News.com, Sept. 30, 2003, available at
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/business/legal/0,39020651,39116777,00.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
32
Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
33
Joe D’Angelo, RIAA Drops Privacy Suit Against 66-Year-Old Grandmother, MTV NEWS, available at
http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1479303/20030925/index.jhtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2003).
34
See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999). See also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
35
According to the court in the second Verizon decision, ISPs have standing to challenge the DMCA on behalf of
Internet users whose First Amendment rights may be affected by the outcome. See In re Verizon Internet Services,
Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 257 (D.D.C. 2003).
36
Brief in Support of Motion to Quash, available at http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=13791&c=251
(last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
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RIAA contends that the notification requirements, which include a sworn declaration of
purpose and statement of good faith under penalty of perjury, provide sufficient procedural
safeguards to prevent substantial denial of First and Fifth Amendment rights. 37 The court in the
second Verizon decision agreed, adding that the First Amendment does offer some protection to
anonymous expression on the Internet, but the degree of protection is minimal where alleged
copyright infringement is the expression at issue. 38 Implicit in this holding is the presumption
that users of peer-to-peer software are engaging in copyright infringement. While in practice this
is usually correct, peer-to-peer software can be used to transfer noncopyrighted files as well. 39 If
peer-to-peer software users are not presumed to be engaging in copyright infringement, then why
should the mere allegation of copyright infringement be sufficient to abridge users’ First
Amendment rights? On the other hand, if the presumption does exist, then how can peer-to-peer
software companies continue to avoid liability for contributory infringement? After all, these
companies have created a forum with the express purpose of expediting the transfer of digital
files, and they are also aware that users engage in illegal practices using this software. 40
Nevertheless, these peer-to-peer software companies have failed to provide any safeguards
against copyright infringement by users who are anonymous. Thus, since software companies

37

Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of the Recording Industry Association of America and Urging

Affirmance, available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/pdf/amicusBriefSupportRIAA.pdf (last visited Nov.
29, 2003).
38

Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 260.
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003). “Plaintiffs do
not dispute that Defendants’ software is being used, and could be used, for substantial noninfringing purposes.” Id.
at 1036.
40
See id. at 1038. “Here, it is undisputed that Defendants are generally aware that many of their users employ
Defendants’ software to infringe copyrighted works…The question, however, is whether actual knowledge of
specific infringement accrues at a time when either Defendant materially contributes to the alleged infringement,
and can therefore do something about it.” Id.
39
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acknowledge these general practices on their networks and still choose to remain neutral, the
presumption of copyright infringement must exist, rendering the Verizon court correct in
reducing First and Fifth Amendment protection accordingly.
V.

Conclusion

Irrespective of the holding in the Verizon decisions, the broad authority granted to court
clerks acting outside of the scope of the judiciary may well be unconstitutional as violative of
Article III’s case or controversy limitation. The idea that a court clerk has the authority to issue
a subpoena that is considered to be outside the scope of the judicial branch appears to be an
illogical stretch rationalized under the theory of ministerial duties. Yet the fact that the clerk
exercises no discretion in the matter makes the position seem more like a function of the
legislative branch. At the same time, this lack of discretion raises substantial concerns regarding
the relative ease that a copyright holder has in obtaining a subpoena and thus the identity of any
Internet user suspected of copyright infringement. One compromise that should be reconsidered
is allowing a DMCA subpoena to be issued only in connection with a pending copyright
lawsuit. 41
While subpoena power under the DMCA is overbroad to some extent, the court in
Verizon correctly concluded that the risk of widespread “cyberstalking” is minimal. The fact that
one can conceive of a manner in which a statute can be abused should not create a significant
challenge to its constitutionality. However, an IP address is not a very reliable way of obtaining
a user’s identity. There will undoubtedly be a number of users that are incorrectly identified
using this method. For example, malicious computer experts are sometimes able to compromise
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Brief As Amici Curiae In Support of Appellant Verizon Internet Services and Urging Reversal, available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/copyright/verizon/Appeal_1_amicus.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
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the security of unsuspecting systems in order to utilize an IP address as their own, and the rapidly
emerging technology of wireless Internet could allow individuals to covertly take advantage of
another user’s broadband Internet account from a nearby location.
Even mistaken identification will probably not have the “chilling effect” on freedom of
speech and expression on the Internet that the ACLU and ISPs contemplate. Since Americans
have a right to anonymity over the Internet, they should not expect their identities to be revealed
to a copyright holder unless they have actually been engaging in copyright infringement. Users
who are not aware that they have the right to anonymity will have no reason to change their
Internet-related expression once they discover that they might be mistakenly identified. Due to
the low frequency of mistaken identification, users who are aware that they have a right to
anonymity but are not violating copyright laws should not fear that they might be identified
under the DMCA, and therefore should have no reason to refrain from speech or expression.
Hence, the only group of users whose First Amendment rights would be affected by these
lawsuits would be those engaging in copyright infringement, unless the subpoena power is
thoroughly abused.
Those interested in preventing the widespread distribution of copyrighted files will have
to find a way to target peer-to-peer software companies if the subpoena power under the DMCA
is held on appeal as unconstitutional. The strongest post-Verizon arguments for ISPs to make
will focus on the lack of reliability and overbreadth associated with determining users’ identities
based upon IP addresses, the absence of reasonable monetary compensation for compliance with
the subpoenas, and the substantial burden placed on the judiciary in connection with subpoena
requests. These arguments, in combination with the argument that the DMCA violates the case
or controversy limitation of Article III, will likely result in the ISPs winning on appeal. When
10
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they do prevail, RIAA will be powerless to prevent the unauthorized and illegal transfer of its
copyrighted material over the Internet with the use of peer-to-peer software, and the music and
motion picture industries will continue to suffer accordingly until Congress develops new
legislation to address this issue.
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